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by an economy, even though growth in some significant meanings of
economic capacity is neither greater nor smaller than it would have
been had an alternative course been followed. In any event, what
applies to the best of conditions applies with magnified force to the
Soviet Union. If sound and relevant judgments are to be made on
Soviet economic growth, the evidence must be summarized in a variety
of ways, only one of which is the broad production index.
I want to suggest some of these ways, and to explore one in some
detail. Despite the ambitious title originally assigned to this paper,
my discussion will have to be limited to industrial growth, since that
is the area I have been working in. The data that will be presented have
been drawn from a study under way at the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research; they are, of course, preliminary and subject to re-
vision. In any event, a full explanation of what lies behind them will be
published when the study is completed. It must be said here that all
Soviet data are based ultimately on information published in the Soviet
Union; and, though efforts have been made to remedy the most obvious
deficiencies, no scholar can have a clear conscience in working with
Soviet data as if they were fully reliable. A few additional remarks
will be made on this crucial point at the conclusion of this paper.
II
Suppose we raise the following question: How successful has the
Soviet Union been in matching the industrial achievements of the
United States? One way to approach an answer is to make an industry-
by-industry comparison of Soviet and American growth in physical
output, in each case confining the comparison to periods in which
American and Soviet industries were of equivalent size.1 A comparison
'Any study of individual industries involves the many familiar problems of defining
each industry in a relevant way and of finding comparable industrial categories for differ-
ent economies. The problem of definition has been "solved" in part by the availability of
Soviet data. In general, theindustries—itis perhaps more accurate to say "commodities"—
chosen for study are the most narrowly defined categories for which Soviet data on
physical output can be found covering the entire Soviet period. Relying on narrow con-
cepts of industries makes for obvious difficulties in interpreting differences in growth as
between economies with differing endowments of resources. Thus the petroleum industry
has shown a much more rapid development in the United States than in the Soviet Union
over comparable periods, while the coal industry has not. The comparatively slower growth
of coal in the United States is essentially the result of comparatively better opportunities
in the petroleum industry, not of any relatively depressive factors applicable to the "fuel
industry" as a whole. it would therefore be useful to examine comparative developments
in the fuel industry as well as in its components and similarly in the case of other in-
dustrial groups. Analysis of this sort is planned for the study under way at the National
Bureau.
It should also be pointed out that there are gross deficiencies in the definitions of in-
dustries as given in Soviet statistical materials. Often little is known about a Soviet in-
dustry beyond a broadly descriptive title—as "copper," "paper," "canned food," and so
on. Under these circumstances, the choice of American counterparts is necessarily some-
what arbitrary, though we have done our best to choose what seemed to be the most
similar industries.620 AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
of this sort, while containing flaws of its own, makes. allowance for, the
important fact that most individual industries tend to grow more slowly
percentagewise as they get older and larger—a phenomenon char-
acteristic of the Soviet Union as well as the United States. An industry-
by-industry comparison of percentage growth rates for concurrent
periods does not make such an allowance and may produce misleading
conclusions to the extent that mature American industries are being
compared in growth with youthful Soviet counterparts. A simple and
direct method. of ,making the desired kind of comparison is to examine
the lag of Soviet output behind American output and what has hap-
pened to the lag over time.
This is done in Tables 1 and 2, where the Soviet lag in both total
and per capita output is listed for 37 industries as of three bench mark
years: 1913, 1937, and 1955. Although the sample of industries has
been dictated by availability of data on physical output, it does cover
a fair number of so-called "basic" industrial materials and consumer
"staples." Cyclical fluctuations have been smoothed out of the Ameri-
can output series—essentially through nine-year moving averages—so
that comparisons would not be made with unusual temporary peaks in
American output. On the other hand, Soviet series were not similarly
smoothed because their fluctuations are fundamentally different in
nature from our own cycles, and also because serious technical prob-
lenis arise as a result of marked discontinuities in the series. Similarly,
no adjustment has been made for gains in Soviet output resulting from
territorial expansion after World War Ii; i.e., such gains are included
in the data. Therefore, on thesescores, the lags are computed favorably
for the Soviet Union, at least as a general rule.
The meaning of these lags and of their changes over time is best
shown through an In 1913, the Russian production of steel
ingots within the interwar territory of the Soviet Union was roughly
equal to production achieved in the United States around 1892, or 21
years earlier. Hence the lag in 1913 was 21. years. The lag had risen to
32 years in 1937, and fell somewhat from that point to a level of 29
years in 1955. Thus Soviet production of steel ingots was 8 years
further behind American production in 1955 than it had been in 1913,
which is to say that it has taken the Soviet Union 42 years (1913-55) to
accomplish what the United States had done in 34 (1892-1926). 'On a
per capita basis, the lag increased from 30 years in 1913 to 40 in 1937,
and to 49 in 1955. Production per capita was 19 years further behind
in 1955 than it had been in 1913; the same expansion in per capita
output had taken, place in the United States in 23 years (1883-1906),
instead of in 42.
When we consider the entire group of industries, we note that in the
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TABLEI
LAG OF TILE SOVIET UNION BEHIND TILE UNITED STATES IN OUTPUT,
BENcH MARK DATES, 37
Lag
(Number of years)
Increase or Decrease (—)
inLag
1913 1937 19551913—371937—551913—55
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* U.S.output taken as centered nine-year moving average, with minor modifications. Soviet
output covers interwar territory of the Soviet Union for 1913 and 1937, and postwar territory
for 1955. A Soviet lead is indicated by a negative sign in columns 1—3. Where U.S. data do
not go back far enough to give the full lag, the calculable Jag is followed by a plus sign.
f Insufficient data to indicate whether the lag increased or decreased.
Soviet output exceeds U.S. output up to the present.
§ Decrease in lag of unknown magnitude.
**Mediansin the last three columns are calculated from data columns; i.e., they
are median increases in lag, not increases in the median lags given in the first three columns.
The median increases in lag are derived from data for the following numbers of industries:
1913—37, 32; 1937—55, 36; 1913—55, 31.
case of total output the median lag—that lag exceeded by half the in-
dustries and fallen short of by the other half—was 28 years in 1913,
36 in 1937, and 35 in 1955. The median lag in per capita output was 56622 AMERICANECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
TABLE 2
LAG OPTHESOWET UNION BEHIND THEUNITED STATES IN PER CAPITA OUTPUT,
BENCHMARK DATES, 37 INDUSTRLES*
. Lag
(Number of years)
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For notes *andf, see Table 1.
See note **inTable 1. The median increases in lag are derived from data for the following
numbers of industries: 1913—37, 19; 1937—55, 28; 1913—55, 21.
§Insufficientdata to calculate median.
years in 1955; equally precise calculations be made for other
bench mark years in the case of per capita lags, because many lags are
so long they cannot be measured—American statistics on output do not
go back far enough to show output per capita as small as in the Soviet
Union. Changes in per capita lags can, however, be measured for 21
industries over the Soviet era as a whole, and the median of these is an
increase 0113 years. Moreover, 16 of the 21 industries show an increaseSOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 623
in lag. In the case of total output as distinct from per capita output,
the median increase in lag is 9 years, and 24 of 31 industries show an
increase. Per capita lags have generally increased over recent years
(1937-55) as well as over the Soviet period as a whole, but this is not.
true for lags in total output: in that case more industries show a de-
crease in lag over recent years than show an increase, the count being
20 industries to 14.2
Whatmay we then conclude? This is obviously not the place for
an exhaustive analysis, but let me indicate, with appropriate qualifica-
tions, some inferences that might be drawn. In the first place, Soviet
industry seems still to be and a half decades behind us in
levels of output and about five and a half decades in levels of per capita
output. This is, of course, a generalization about average performance
crudely defined; in some areas the Soviet Union is much closer
to us historically, in others much further behind. Second, and with
the samei qualification, the development of Soviet industry is roughly.
equivalent to what took place in this country in the four decades
bracketing the turn of this century—in per capita terms, in an even
earlier period ending around the turn of the century. Third, over the
Soviet era as a whole, Soviet industries have generally lost historical
ground to their American counterparts—the lags have generally in-
creased—in terms of both total and per capita output. That is, growth
from the same level of output, total or per capita, has been slower
in Soviet than in American industries. This tendency is, incidentally,
not unique to the Soviet era; the same thing was happening over the
last four decades of the Czarist period. Fourth, while Soviet industries
2 summarystatistics given here reflect, of course, conditions in industries where
growth has been deliberately retarded by Soviet authorities in order to promote growth
in other industries. The difference in performance between the neglected and favored sec-
tors may be indicated in part by computing summary statistics separately for industries
producing consumer goods, on the one hand, and for all other industrLs, on the other
hand. For instance, if the last 14 items in Tables 1 and 2aretaken as consumer goods,
and the first 23 items as aU other goods, the blowing results are obtained:
Median Lag
(Number of years)
Median Increase or Decrease
(—)inLags































* Derivedfrom the following numbers of industries for 1913—37, 1937—55, and 1913—55
respectively: total output, consumer goods—8, 12, and 8; per capita output, consumer
goods—5, 7, and 6; total output, all other goods—23 in each case; per capita output, all other
goods—14,21, and15.
t Insufficientdata to calculate median lag.624 AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
have tended in recent years to gain ground in terms of total output, they
have continued to lose ground in terms of per capita output.
To anticipate questions that must have arisen in the minds of many,
let me say right away that this has been a recital of the raw historical
record for the Soviet era as a whole, which cannot serve in itself as an
adequate guide to future performance. Bad years of growth—e.g., 19 13-
28—have been indiscriminately mixed with good, and the conditions
producing those bad years may never recur with the same intensity.
Such analysis has the same faults as focusing solely on the best years
of growth; here, too, there were many peculiarities not likely to persist
over the long term. A proper appraisal of underlying trends requires
that attention be paid to both short and long periods. But we can attend
to only one thing at a time, and the essential purpose of this brief
paper is to bring the picture of growth trends into focus by looking at
long-range performance. Needless to say, the study now under way at
the National Bureau will give much more detailed attention to the
problems mentioned here.
While digressing on qualifications, itis worth pointing out that
Soviet products seem to be generally inferior in quality to their Ameri-
can counterparts, even to those produced many years earlier. More-
over, quality seems to have deteriorated in many industries over at
least parts of the Soviet era. The inferiority and deterioration are most
marked for consumer goods, but they also hold for many industrial
materials. -It has not been possible to make allowance for these factors,
and hence the lags and their changes are biased in favor of the Soviet
Union. This matter is apart from the question of how reliable Soviet
data are on the quantitative side, quality ignored. On that score, it
hardly seems likely that Soviet authorities have practiced the art of
understatement in heralding their achievements.
III
Let us now return to the main theme and examine more closely the
suggestion that industrial development in the Soviet era, unadjusted
for population, is similar to, though slower than, our own during the
period This inference has been drawn from an analysis that
was not confined to a single period of growth in the United States. On
the contrary, about half the comparisons between Soviet and American
industries involved American periods ending earlier than 1920 and the
other half involved periods ending later. Hence there has been some
picking and choosing among different periods in American industrial
'It would be interesting to go into the question of comparable periods of industrial
development on a per capita basis, but this would take us back to a period in American
history where data on production are too meager to support a careful study.